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Abstract
We report data from laboratory experiments where participants were primed using phrases related to markets and trade.
Participants then participated in trust games with anonymous strangers. The decisions of primed participants are compared
to those of a control group. We find evidence that priming for market participation affects positively the beliefs regarding
the trustworthiness of anonymous strangers and increases trusting decisions.
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and generalized trust across countries. One reason for these
conflicting results may be that, in most empirical studies, exposure
to markets or other formal institutions is endogenous to the
environment rather than randomly and exogenously assigned by
the investigator [3]. Consequently, the effect of markets on prosocial behaviors such as trust is extremely difficult to infer from
naturally occurring data.
To circumvent endogeneity problems we employ a laboratory
experiment with randomized control. Our design consists of
randomly priming participants, without their awareness, to think
about markets. Following this they participate in a trust game [23].
We find a positive effect of market-priming on the amount sent by
senders to anonymous partners. Further, using a Cox decomposition [24] we offer evidence that this increase is a consequence of
increased trust rather than an increase in altruistic generosity.
This is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, that
measures the effect of priming markets on trust, and the first study
that deploys randomized control in an effort to understand the
relationship between markets and trust (one related paper is [22],
which looked at the relationship between markets and cooperation
in a public goods game without using priming methods).
North [5] argues that the proliferation of formal institutions in
modern economic history helped move society from narrowly
personal to more broadly anonymous exchange and thereby
helped launch the remarkable economic growth we have witnessed
since the 18th century. As institutions improved, generalized trust
in commerce can arise as a byproduct of clear formal rules, greater
economic and political competition, and enhanced enforcement.
Our results suggest an indirect mechanism that may reinforce
direct institutional effects. In particular, the presence of decentralized market institutions may promote trust over time by
providing repeated opportunities to experience benefits from
interactions with strangers.

Introduction
We report data from a laboratory experiment that suggests
participation in markets causes trusting behavior to increase. We
say that trust is present when one party (the sender) places
resources at the disposal of another party (responder) under the
expectation that this will increase the sender’s payoff, and in the
absence of any enforceable commitment by the responder. An
essential feature of trust is that the sender is vulnerable in a way
that is not captured entirely by probabilistic risk [1]. An additional
feature of trust is that an absence of trust where trust could be
present constitutes social inefficiency, i.e., society leaving resources
on the table.
The positive effects of trust on economic growth have been well
documented [2-5], while the effect of formal institutions–including
markets–on trust has generated less consistent findings. In his
investigation of the effect of markets and competitiveness on
morality, Chen [6] highlights the diverse views in the literature: on
the one hand, commerce leads to more gentle manners [7], it
cordializes mankind [8], and enhances man’s virtues [9-11]. On
the other hand, some suggest the competitive instinct degrades
judgment [12] and undermines society’s moral foundations
[13].Additionally, markets may hurt altruism and cooperation
[14] and formal institutions, such as markets, can have adverse
effects on informal institutions and social norms [15-17].
Existing empirical research has not resolved these contradictions. Henrich et al.’s [18-20] study of small-scale societies suggests
that exposure to markets increases the strength of other-regarding
preferences yet has little effect on cooperation. In other laboratory
studies, Herrmann et al. [21] find that cooperation is enhanced by
exposure to markets, yet Reeson and Tisdell [22] find the opposite.
Using macroeconomic data, Zak and Knack [3] find a strong
relationship between the incidence of markets/formal institutions
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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act of giving. Other models assume that players have a distaste for
inequity [26], that they seek to reciprocate kind actions with
rewards and unkind actions with punishments [27-28], or that
people like to signal altruism to themselves and others [29],
[30].The other alternatives model players as possessing limited
cognitive abilities. This leads to behavior being sensitive to payoffirrelevant features of the environment, such as the wording of
instructions [31]. Priming research has generated important
insights in the study of the effects of cognitive limitations.

Background
The Simplified Trust Game
Consider the simplified trust game (henceforth STG) shown in
Figure 1, which is played with an anonymous partner. The sender
starts with $8 and can choose to send $0, $2, $4 or $6 to the
responder. Any amount sent is tripled. Upon observing the
sender’s choice, the responder chooses how much of the tripled
amount to return to the sender, keeping the rest for herself.
In the trust game, the standard assumption is that players are
selfish earnings maximizers, and that this is common knowledge.
The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is socially
inefficient: the responder should return nothing, and thus the
sender should send nothing. Note that in the STG, the
determinant of social efficiency is trust: the amount that the
sender sends; and the larger the amount sent, the higher the
efficiency. Trustworthiness (the amount returned by the responder) merely determines the distribution of the economic pie
conditional upon its size. Perceptions of trustworthiness do have
an indirect effect on efficiency via their effect on the likelihood of
trust, which is captured by the SPNE argument. However,
conditional on a certain level of trust, variation in trustworthiness
has no impact upon efficiency.
Data from experiments are regularly inconsistent with the
predictions of zero trust (thus minimal efficiency) [23]: senders on
average send about half of their endowment and responders return
about that amount back, with the absolute amount returned by
responders increasing in the amount received from the senders.
Consequently, social efficiency is greater than predicted by the
SPNE.
This has led economists to consider alternative assumptions
about human preferences. One class of alternatives allows for
other-regarding preferences. The most basic is pure altruism
whereby players explicitly care about each other’s welfare, or
impure altruism [25], where players take direct pleasure from the

Priming Research
Social psychology research has established that the mental
representation of a phenomenon can have an effect on behavior
outside the context of that phenomenon. An example would be
someone unconsciously walking slowly after watching a commercial about elderly people; in this case, the mental representation of
elderly people contains the observation that elderly people tend to
walk slowly, and this then affects the person’s walking speed.
An important driver of these behavioral effects of mental
representations is that people have limited cognitive abilities. This
prevents them from always accessing the most relevant mental
representations required for a task or decision, and it means that
mental representations that have been recently or chronically
accessed have an effect on behavior even if they are not directly
relevant. This effect can be thought of as a spillover effect of the
mental representation. In the walking example above, the
commercial increased the accessibility of the mental representation
of elderly people and it had an effect on walking speed despite its
irrelevance to what we would normally regard as the determinants
of walking speed, such as how quickly the person feels that they
need to walk and their physical capabilities.
Formally, the effect of a mental representation M on decision D
is mediated by the accessibility of M at the time in which decision
D is being made. When completely inaccessible, the effect is zero;
as the level of accessibility increases, so too does the size of the
effect. Social psychologists have developed techniques for manipulating the accessibility of a mental representation, allowing them
to estimate the effect of the mental representation on a decision.
Consider the following simple model adapted from [32]. Let d
be an action choice, such as the choice of food at a restaurant. An
individual has a mental representation M with accessibility a[½0,1.
M may be irrelevant in the sense that the individual would not
consciously choose to access it when choosing d. Let d0 denote the
individual’s preferred choice when M is completely inaccessible,
a~0, and let dM denote the individual’s preferred choice when M
is maximally accessible, a~1. The individual chooses d to
maximize:
U~{(1{a)(d{d 0 )2 {a(d{dM )2
The individual will therefore choose d  ~(1{a)d0 zadM . The
researcher wants to estimate the effect of the mental representation, dM {d0 . If the researcher can manipulate a, then she can
estimate Ld  =La~dM {d0 .
Priming research is the study of techniques for varying a and the
effects of varying a. a is considered to have some steady-state value

a; if 
aw0 then M is chronically accessible, e.g., someone who
works in a hospital has mental representations of health-related
issues accessible throughout the day (including outside work; see
[33]). The researcher can increase a by ew0 using a variety of
methods, including the word-rearrangement tasks which we use in
our experiments below.

Figure 1. Simplified trust game; player 1 = Sender, player 2 =
Responder.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055968.g001
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strangers. This is in fact what Henrich et al. [35] find in their study
of market participation in primitive societies.
Combining these two observations with humans’ cognitive
limitations allows us to propose a mechanism linking markets and
trust. The limits of cognition prevent mental representations from
encoding all the relevant game-theoretic considerations of a
situation, including credible threats of punishment for breaching a
contract. Plausibly, an individual with a history of marketmediated economic interactions with strangers would (potentially
incorrectly) assign some of the desirable behavior of trading
partners to increased trustworthiness of those trading partners
rather than a rational desire to avoid breach-of-contract-punishment by those partners. Thus our main hypothesis is that market
participation increases trust and trustworthiness.
An additional factor that reinforces this mechanism is that
compared to the counterfactual of not participating in a particular
market, market participation is generally a positive experience for
all parties. Ultimately, this derives from the fact that all the parties
in a trade have veto power: if any party felt as if they were not
benefiting from the exchange, then they would simply not
participate.
(For goods and services where some aspects of the satisfaction
from consumption are hidden from the buyer at the point of
purchase, e.g., when buying a used car, there is certainly room for
a negative experience. However there a variety of tools at the
consumer’s disposal that ensure that such episodes are the
exception rather than the norm, such as consumer reviews,
reputational concerns of the seller, the ability to return unsatisfactory goods and so on. Moreover the purchaser always has a veto
right suggesting that on average, one does not enter such trades
without a reasonable expectation of a positive outcome, an
expectation likely built upon a history of positive outcomes in
similar trades.).

Upon estimating the causal effect of a mental representation, a
follow-up question is: what determines the mental representation?
This is the focus of the large literature on stereotyping (see for
example [34]). Mental representations are shaped by an individual’s experiences. Thus, for example, an individual’s mental
representation of soccer is based upon her own experiences with
soccer. Initially, she might experience soccer primarily through
playing it and so, if she enjoys playing soccer, her mental
representation should be a positive one. Should she subsequently
have a sequence of negative experiences, such as incurring painful
injuries while playing, this will render her mental representation of
soccer more negative.
We now use this model linking the experiences that form M, the
accessibility of M and the decision D to analyze the relationship
between markets and trust.

Application to Markets and Trust
What is the effect of the mental representation of markets on the
decisions to trust and to be trustworthy? The exposure of people to
markets, primarily through participating in markets, generates a
mental representation of markets. This mental representation may
be chronically accessible depending on the frequency of an
individual’s interaction with markets. Circumstantial factors may
make it temporarily more accessible at any given point in time,
yielding a gross accessibility of the mental representation (for
further discussion see [33]).
At various junctures, an individual may find herself needing to
make a trust or trustworthiness decision. If the mental representation of markets is accessible, then this decision may be affected.
Existing theoretical and empirical evidence allows us to speculate
about the sign of the effect, though due in part to an absence of
randomized control, the literature is nowhere near consensus. Our
hypotheses are derived primarily from the following two observations.
Observation 1. Economic interactions with strangers in the
absence of markets might be dangerous and should be avoided.
Economic interactions in the absence of markets typically
require some degree of trust. Throughout most of our evolutionary
history, interactions with strangers have been fraught with danger
and exploitation [20], hence strangers are generally unworthy of
the trust required for an economic interaction. On the other hand,
economic interactions in markets can generate positive outcome
and positive experiences for all parties. Individuals come to
associate reciprocal benefits to market transactions, and be more
willing to trust and being trustworthy in market exchanges.
Observation 2. Where the rule of law is enforced, markets
interactions do not require a high level of personal trust.
The threat of third-party punishment should a trader breach the
terms of a contract significantly decreases the risk and vulnerability
otherwise associated with engaging in an economic transaction
[5].This greatly facilitates the creation of economic surplus
through exchange. For this reason, markets create a substantial
upside to interacting with strangers (beyond any existing upside,
e.g., some people enjoy meeting new people).
Naturally, even in the presence of markets, individuals may
choose to trade with people they know and to avoid strangers even
if markets afford them some protection from those strangers.
However economic surplus is often highest when the parties
interacting differ in their preferences/endowments and when the
parties have the opportunity to specialize in production. The
heterogeneity and specialization required for the generation of
economic surplus typically lie outside the radius of personal
acquaintances. Thus we would expect to see a positive association
between market proliferation and interactions with anonymous
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

Experimental Strategy
Our manipulation derives from the priming literature ([36]; see
[32] for an example from the economics literature). We lead
participants in some treatments to think about markets and trade.
Immediately following this, we ask them to play a STG involving
an anonymous stranger. We compare the behavior of treated
individuals with that of a control group that did not experience
such priming. This allows us to gather evidence on the effect of
markets on the beliefs about anonymous strangers. If the marketprimed group trusts more, then this supports our main hypothesis
that markets have a positive effect on trust.
We chose not to measure beliefs directly for several reasons.
First, and most importantly, priming effects can evaporate quickly
[36], and inserting a belief-elicitation task between the priming
and the main task risked attenuating the treatment effect. Second,
we were concerned by the possibility of participants hedging
against their decisions rather than stating their true beliefs (under
incentivized beliefs). The combination of our two experiments in
this study helps us gather evidence on expectations without
measuring them directly using an established method in the
literature. An extension to this paper might consider an alternative
method for addressing the above drawbacks: running extra
sessions with two groups. One makes decisions like Experiment
I, and the other only has its beliefs about the actions of the other
group elicited. This way, the beliefs can be incentivized without
fear of hedging. However this comes at the cost of a greater
deviation in the nature of the instructions compared to the method
we use in this study.
We employ randomized control to circumvent the endogeneity
problem that arises in the analysis of naturally occurring data.
3
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Note that market effects on trust in the experiment do not operate
via any effect on incentives–only via context. In controlled
experiments, when manipulating context, experimenter demand
effects are a concern [36], [37]. Experimenter demand effects are
(conscious or unconscious) changes in experimental subjects’
behavior resulting from cues about what constitutes appropriate
behavior, possibly due to forming an interpretation of the
experiment’s purpose. Experimental economists are typically
unconcerned by such demand effects since they are investigating
the causal effect of changes in incentives or other substantial
institutional features, changes that are likely to overwhelm the
effect of contextual factors [38].Our concerns stem from restricting
our focus to payoff-irrelevant features of the environment, and we
take steps to address these concerns.

the participant was aware of the priming and the goals of the
experiment. In every case, participants were unaware they were
primed.

Research Hypotheses
The STG requires two decisions between anonymous strangers:
the sender chooses how much to send and the responder chooses
how much to return. A strategic analysis by either player leaves
scant ground for optimism about the outcome of the interaction:
trust and trustworthiness should be zero. This is due in part to the
anonymity of the interaction and the absence of third-party
enforcement. However given limited cognition, an accessible
mental representation of markets may affect decisions.
Hypothesis 1a. In the STG, senders primed to think about
markets (treatment) send a larger amount on average than those
under the control prime (control).
(See the SI for a mathematical statement of our hypotheses.)
The sender’s decision calculus is as follows. The strategic analysis
leaves the sender unwilling to trust an anonymous stranger.
However the accessible market representation involves a positive
view of the results of interacting with an anonymous stranger,
where both parties benefit from the interaction. Therefore trust is
higher when the market representation is more accessible.
Hypothesis 1b. In the STG, responders primed to think
about markets (treatment), at each of their three decision nodes,
choose to return a larger amount than those under the control
prime (control).
The responder’s decision calculus is as follows. The strategic
analysis leaves the responder unwilling to reciprocate trust, since
she is simply improving the sender’s lot at her own expense.
However the accessible market representation involves a positive
view of the results of interacting with an anonymous stranger,
where both parties benefit from the interaction. Therefore
trustworthiness is higher when the market representation is more
accessible.
In both the sender’s and the responder’s decision, the decisionmaker ignores the fact that part of the reason all parties in an
anonymous market transaction succeed is the threat of third-party
enforcement, and that this threat is absent in the trust game.
However imperfect cognition ensures that this fact does not
uniquely dominate the decision calculus.

Experiment I: Simple Trust Game
Procedure
Participants were students from George Mason University.
Each session had either eight or ten participants performing two
tasks. The first was a priming task [36]. Control and treatment
groups perform a task that differed only in that ‘markets’ were
primed in the treatment, and ‘no coherent theme’ was primed in
the control. To avoid experimenter demand effects, participants
were not informed of the goal of the priming task, nor did any
deduce it or become aware of it inadvertently (see the funneled
debriefing below).
The priming task was as follows. Each participant faced 15 lists
of five words. In each list, the words were randomly arranged, and
the participant needed to form a grammatically correct sentence
using four of the five words. For example, in the list ,flew, eagle,
the, plane, around., an acceptable solution was ,the eagle flew
around.. Participants were allotted six minutes to complete this
task, which was not saliently rewarded.
We created a list of words associated with markets and trade
using a thesaurus and we validated our choices by asking a
separate group of participants to list words that make them think
about markets and/or trade (see Table S1 in File S1 for the full
lists; they were created by taking one of the exemplary lists
provided in [36] and giving it a market theme). The difference
between treatment and control was that in the treatment, 12 of the
15 lists had a word that was relevant to markets and/or trade.
Participants in each session were randomly assigned either
treatment or control.
The second task was the STG shown in Figure 1. We used the
STG rather than the conventional trust game because we wanted
to use the strategy method for the responders, and so we had to
limit the number of their decision nodes. We wanted to use the
strategy method to maximize the data acquired from each
participant, and hence power.
Participants were randomized into the role of either the sender
or the responder and were anonymously matched with a unique
partner. Senders and responders were in the same room and all
instructions were read out aloud. The responders’ strategy choice
involved describing what they would do in each of their three
possible decision nodes, i.e., what they would do if the sender
sends $2, what they would do if the sender sends $4, and what they
would do if the sender sends $6 (known as the strategy method).
Behavior in the game yielded a measure of trust (senders) and
trustworthiness (responders).
In each of the first twelve sessions, following the second task, we
randomly selected two participants who were in the treatment and
asked them to perform a funneled debriefing [36]. This is a short,
verbally-administered survey that investigates the extent to which
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

Results
We ran 14 sessions of the STG, yielding a total of 130
observations: 31 senders +31 responders in the control, and 34
senders +34 responders in the treatment. The main descriptive
statistics are in Table 1, and they are graphed in Figure 2. To test
Hypothesis 1a, we compare sender behavior in the control prime
condition (control) to sender behavior in the market prime
condition (treatment).
Result 1a. In the STG, senders primed to think about
markets send substantially more than senders in control.
Senders sent an average of 1.0 more under the market prime
than under control, as can be seen in the first pair of bars in
Figure 2. (Recall that the amount sent is tripled.) This difference is
large (over half a standard deviation) and it is significant at the
p,0.05 level using either a two-sided t-test or Mann-Whitney test.
Using a regression to control for session effects (results available on
request) leads to an increase in the magnitude of the treatment
effect and a decrease in the p-value (p,0.01).
Result 1b. In the STG, responders under the market prime
(treatment) return insignificantly more than responders under the
control prime (control).
4
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Figure 2. Bar charts (with standard error bands) of average behavior in Experiment 1, the simplified trust game, by condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055968.g002

iment is also consistent with markets having a positive causal effect
on social efficiency.
However as discussed above, there are several determinants of
how much an individual chooses to send in a trust game. Beyond
trust, sender choices are driven by other-regarding preferences,
such as altruism (pure or impure) and inequity aversion [26]. The
experiment below further investigates the source of the treatment
effect on trust.

As can be seen in the last three pairs of bars in Figure 2, at each
of their three decision nodes, responders return more under
treatment (market prime) than under control. The difference is
small (15%, 5% and 10% of a standard deviation, respectively),
and statistically insignificant (all p-values exceed 0.40 regardless of
the statistical test employed).
Recall that Fehr’s definition of trust [1] is the sender placing
resources at the disposal of the responder under the expectation
that this will increase the sender’s payoff, and in the absence of any
legal commitment by the responder. Result 1a finds that market
priming leads to the senders placing greater resources at the
disposal of the responder. This is consistent with the idea that
markets have a positive causal effect on trust. Moreover, since trust
(and not trustworthiness) determines social efficiency, this exper-

Experiment II: Distinguishing Trust from otherregarding Preferences
Procedure
Experiment II used different participants than Experiment I.
Each session had two tasks, the first being identical to the priming

Table 1. Sample means (and standard deviations) for simple trust game; n denotes the number of unique senders and the number
of unique responders, and each responder made three choices.

Sent

Returned if 2 sent

Returned if 4 sent

Returned if 6 sent

Control (n = 31)

2.4 (2.0)

0.65 (1.4)

3.1 (1.9)

5.2 (3.2)

Treatment (n = 34)

3.4 (1.9)

0.85 (1.5)

3.2 (1.8)

5.5 (3.1)

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055968.t001
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task in Experiment I. The second task (Figure 3) was a senderdictator version of the STG: a task equivalent to the STG except
that it is common knowledge that responders have to return
exactly 0 at each of their decision nodes [24]. Senders are now
assured that they will receive nothing back from the responders.
Consequently, according to Fehr’s definition of trust, the sender’s
decision cannot be motivated by trust. In the sender-dictator STG,
senders can only be motivated by other-regarding preferences.
Comparing sender behavior in the STG (Experiment I) with
sender behavior in the sender-dictator STG (Experiment II)
therefore allows us to determine how much of the difference in
sender behavior in treatment vs. control is the result of differences
in trust vis-à-vis differences in other-regarding preferences. (To
keep the comparison as clean as possible, following Cox (24), the
instructions we used in the sender-dictator STG keep the language
as close as possible to the language in the STG instructions.) If, for
example, we find that there is no treatment effect of market prime
on sender behavior in the sender-dictator STG, we can conclude
that the treatment effect of market prime on sender behavior
observed in the STG was the result of a change in trust and not a
change in other-regarding preferences.

behavior in the control prime condition (control) to sender
behavior in the market prime condition (treatment).
Result 2. In the sender-dictator STG, senders send the same
amount when primed to think about markets (treatment) as when
they are given a control prime (control).
The difference in means between treatment (market prime) and
control is less than 1% of a standard deviation, and any statistical
test of the difference yields p.0.9.
The sender-dictator STG is designed to eliminate the role of
trust in motivating senders. Result 2 allows us to interpret Result
1a more definitively. When senders send more under market
prime in the STG (Result 1a), we can conclude that this is the
result of increased trust, and that it is not the result of a change in
other-regarding preferences.
An alternative way of examining this is to pool the data from the
STG and the sender-dictator STG and to run a regression with
three main explanatory variables: a sender-dictator dummy, a
market prime dummy and an interaction (as well as session
dummies). The size and significance of the interaction reflects the
importance of changes in trust vis-à-vis other-regarding preferences. Unsurprisingly, executing this regression confirms Result 2.
Despite the statistical insignificance in Result 1b, we also
conducted a responder-dictator version of the STG in case
changes in other-regarding preference were being offset by
changes in trustworthiness. We found that there was no substantial
change in either.

Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis 2. In the sender-dictator STG, when senders are
primed to think about markets (treatment), they choose to send the
same amount as senders under the control prime (control).
(As above, see the SI for a mathematical presentation.) If
Hypothesis 2 is not falsified, then we can conclude that Result 1a
reflects an increase in trust rather than in the strength of otherregarding preferences or some combination.

Discussion
Using randomized control, we find evidence that priming
markets leaves people more optimistic about the trustworthiness of
anonymous strangers and therefore increases trusting decisions
and, in turn, social efficiency. Given the general mechanisms by
which priming affects behavior–that an individual’s mental
representation of markets is the result of the individual’s
experiences with markets–we can interpret our results as evidence
in favor of the hypothesis that market participation increases trust.
We stress, however, that this is cautious evidence; a wider array of
evidence is necessary for the solidification of this conclusion. For
example a desirable complementary piece of evidence would be a
method that involves the direct elicitation of expectations and that
does not suffer from the drawbacks we describe in footnote 2.Our
results also encourage further studies on which components of
trust are most affected by market participation.
Absent markets, economic interactions with strangers tend to be
negative. Market proliferation allows good things to happen when
interacting with strangers, thus encouraging optimism and leading
to more trusting behaviors. Participation in markets, rather than
making people suspicious, makes people more likely to trust
anonymous strangers. Our results seem therefore to corroborate
the idea of doux commerce [39].
In addition to finding a positive effect on trust, we found that
market priming generates a negligible positive effect on trustworthiness. This may be due to the strategy method, which in some
cases has been shown to attenuate treatment effects [40].
Alternatively it could be caused by the belief about anonymous
strangers affecting trust and trustworthiness differently. Context
may affect trust via the belief of the trustworthiness of an
anonymous stranger and may affect the trustworthiness of the
anonymous stranger via the image that the anonymous stranger
has of himself. It could also be that markets affect trust and
trustworthiness through different channels: through markets one
learns that anonymous strangers are trustworthy and therefore one
becomes more trustful, and through markets one learns that

Results
We ran 9 sessions of the sender-dictator STG, yielding a total of
45 observations: 22 senders in the control and 23 senders in the
treatment (the 22 responders in the control and 23 responders in
the treatment were passive and so they did not yield any
observations). Key descriptive statistics are in Table 2 and they
are graphed in Figure 4.To test Hypothesis 2, we compare sender

Figure 3. Sender-dictator version of the simplified trust game;
player 1 = Sender, Player 2 = Non-playing responder.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055968.g003
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Figure 4. Bar chart (with standard error bands) of average behavior in Experiment 2, the sender-dictator version of the simplified
trust game, by condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055968.g004

on trust by market priming. However since we fail to detect a
significant increase in trustworthiness, the long run effect of market
priming/market participation is merely attenuated (but not
eliminated).
In the existing work on aggregate cross-country data, economic
development is strongly positively associated with the prevalence
of markets, and with measures of generalized trust. Incentives and
information are generally used to explain why market institutions
may have a [positive causal effect on development [9], [43], but in
the existing literature they do not shed light on the relationship
between market institutions and generalized trust. It can be
difficult, therefore, to provide reliable policy recommendations.
Randomized control, such as we used in this study, may increase
the reliability of formalizing policy recommendations [44]. In
particular, our data clarify the causal relationship between markets
and trust and may contribute to reliable policy recommendations
for economic development. While we would advise much caution
in generalizing from a small-scale laboratory experiment to
something the scale of an economy, our results could be a plank
in an argument, for example, that encouraging the proliferation of
markets in areas dominated by non-market exchange could result
in efficiency gains above-and-beyond the direct allocative gains
associated with markets, namely through increases in general levels
of trust.

positive reciprocity generates positive payoffs and therefore one
becomes more trustworthy. This last hypothesis seems in line with
the results of [41] that trustworthiness may be linked to a social
norm of reciprocity, while trust is not. We hope that future
research can shed additional light on the difference between trust
and trustworthiness [42].
Regardless, it is important to recall that conditional on trust,
variation on trustworthiness has no bearing on social efficiency.
Thus the desirability of an increase in trust does not depend upon
there being a concomitant increase in trustworthiness. In the long
run, were the increased trust matched by increased trustworthiness, then there would have been a possibility of a virtuous cycle
whereby the increased trustworthiness reinforces the positive effect
Table 2. Sample means (and standard deviations) for senderdictator simple trust game; n denotes the number of unique
senders.

Sent
Control (n = 22)

2.3 (1.7)

Treatment (n = 23)

2.3 (1.7)

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055968.t002
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